

## Stephanie Ashford: Notes

### Tom Kimmel

- I. Pearl Harbor vs. 9/11
  - a. Attack Reactions
    - i. Pearl Harbor: Magic → decryption of communications between the Japanese military.
      1. Intelligence regarding a possible attack on Pearl Harbor was decoded in the Magic base in the Philippines, but never relayed to Admiral Short in Hawaii.
      2. Theory: Was intelligence regarding the possibility of a Japanese attack deliberately withheld by then Secretary Of War Stimson in an attempt to maneuver the United States into war?
    - ii. 9/11: Intelligence available, but policy rifts amidst the nation's various agencies hindered action.
  - b. Single Greatest Cause for Attack
    - i. Pearl Harbor: The withholding of intelligence from the Hawaiian commanders
      1. Many later testimonies of personnel in the Philippines (including MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, Gen. Willoughby) acknowledge that they were aware the intelligence they received indicated the strong likelihood of specific threats against Pearl Harbor.
    - ii. 9/11: The wall that segregated criminal investigators & intelligence agencies; bureaucracy hindered effective intelligence sharing.
      1. As indicated in the "Wall Memo," Gorelick 1995
  - c. Defense Responsibility:
    - i. Pearl Harbor: Blame for the failure to defend Pearl Harbor from the attack was placed on the Hawaiian army and naval commanders (i.e. General Short/Admiral Kimmel).
    - ii. 9/11: No attempt was made by the 9/11 Commission to place blame on an individual or specific entity.
- II. The contributions of Soviet/Russian espionage. Key question to keep in mind when examining Soviet/Russian involvement: who benefits from their involvement? What motivates them to offer assistance?
  - a. Pearl Harbor
    - i. The U.S. government is believed to have been riddled with Soviet sympathizers and agents who effectively pushed the U.S. into war
      1. Venona: American program to break Soviet spy cables sent from the US to Moscow, 1939-1948
        - a. Approximately 2,900 cables were decoded, amounting to a mere 10% of all the material logged.
        - b. 349 U.S. spies were identified by broken cables, 171 by *name*.
      2. Hull Note of 1941: a de facto ultimatum delivered to Japan by the U.S. that demanded Japanese withdrawal from China.
        - a. Drafted by Harry Dexter White (a key economic advisor to the president), who was later identified by Venona cables as having been a soviet spy. The cables make some mention to a soviet mission, dubbed "Operation Snow," which called upon White to maneuver the U.S. president into war with Japan, thus ensuring security for the Soviet Union.
  - b. 9/11 & Russian involvement

- i. The first sympathy phone call to G.W. Bush was from Putin, who drew comparisons between the U.S. attacks and the attacks Russia had suffered under Chechen terrorists.

Nigel West (a.k.a. Rupert Alason)

Topic: the application of British counterterrorism techniques – having proven themselves as being effective in dealing with the IRA & PIRA - against terrorist targets in Iraq.

- I. The IRA: a brief rundown
  - a. The IRA was a small, highly effective terrorist faction largely due to the fact that they recruited entire families.
    - i. Extremely close-knit, and thus hard to penetrate by outside forces.
  - b. Yet, the British army effectively managed to IRA. It is estimated that, following British military involvement in Ireland, 85% of all the IRA plans were foiled, and 50% of their members had been identified and/or detained.
  - c. IRA was weakened by split between IRA and PIRA
- II. British Military Accomplishments in Ireland
  - a. Neutrality
    - i. The British army – unlike the local Ulster police force – was not predominantly protestant, and was thus more inclined to be accepted and trusted by Eire's people.
    - ii. They were seen strictly as protectors, not invaders.
  - b. Appearance
    - i. Soldiers dimmed-down their combative gear in an attempt to appear less threatening and daunting: Kevlar vests were worn underneath their ordinary, commonplace clothing; helmets were left at home; guns were concealed from the public view.
    - ii. Furthermore, the soldiers would interact with the community (speak with women whilst they shopped, feed candy to children in the villages), thereby gaining their trusts
  - c. Reliance on intelligence & counterterrorism techniques rather than military brute force
    - i. Identify opponents discretely, then track their movements.
      1. Ex: The British army opened a laundry, which doubled as a forensics laboratory. In addition to washing the clothes of the Irish citizens, they would test for remnants of gunpowder or explosives.
      2. An extensive vehicle database put in place throughout Great Britain and Ireland to track vehicles by their registrations & license plates.
      3. As IRA/PIRA members were often living in impoverished conditions, collecting money from the state and taking up residence in welfare (read: state-owned) housing, MI-5 could easily track down and bug these houses.
      4. Technology also implemented in vehicle tracking devices, as was the case with Gerry Adams. MI-5 had 84 vehicles outfitted at the factory with complex tracking devices, then sold these vehicles to suspicious persons in Ireland.
    - ii. Human recruitment: a dirty, but effective means of intelligence gathering
      1. Poverty breeds terrorism. Monetary incentives often bred cooperation.
      2. More often than not, the British army was able to recruit agents not because of the agents' greed, but their concerns for their family members and their involvement in the IRA/PIRA
      3. However, as human intelligence is a risky and oftentimes dirty business, intelligence agencies need full political commitment and support. Human

beings are fallible and volatile, and intelligence agencies must be given some leeway when dealing with them.

- III. Applying such techniques to Iraq
  - a. Transform U.S. image from militaristic invaders to peacekeeping force
  - b. Strengthen the presence of intelligence & counterterrorism techniques
  - c. Be mobile and nomadic: ex, the British, when dealing with the IRA/PIRA, never established set vehicle checkpoints, as they were predictable and vulnerable to attack. Instead, the army would establish temporary checkpoints (~ 20min).
    - i. Advantages: Army can quickly act upon new intelligence, terrorists are continuously “on their toes”
  - d. Work to contain terrorism rather than convert the Iraqi people to our ways.


### Dennis Pluchinsky

- I. Failures of terrorist threat analysis
  - a. ‘Terrorism’ is an abstract concept and impossible to define
    - i. There is no one global definition for the word; not even the U.S. has one concrete definition! The FBI, Dept. of State, and Justice Dept. all claim definitions for ‘terrorism.’
    - ii. “One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” and “No one is a terrorist who stands for a just cause.”
      - 1. Who is the U.S. to claim to be able to define terrorism or just causes for acts of terrorism?
- II. The evolution of a terrorist groups
  - a. Members share a common grievance. A terrorist group cannot exist without alleged grievances.
  - b. Activist cadres form: members are willing to take actions to appease their grievances
  - c. Militant analysis causes the construction of a terrorist group: armed struggle is seen as the only course of action. This is what distinguishes moderate activists from violent terrorists
- III. Religious Terrorism
  - a. Terrorism with a religious agenda, categorized into three dimensions:
    - i. Anti-state
    - ii. Inter-sect
    - iii. Inter-religion
  - b. Most prevalent & dangerous form of religious terrorism = Islamic extremist.
    - i. Religious terrorism is so dangerous, as members are willing to die for their beliefs
- IV. Islamic Extremism
  - a. Origins and beliefs of Islamic extremists
    - i. Roots of extremist thought
      - 1. Extremists recall the “Glorious Era” of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century, when the Arab world prospered greatly
      - 2. They feel humiliated by the West and threatened by the spread of Christianity
      - 3. Muslim oppression by Western society is a reflection of Allah’s disapproval with modern-day Muslims. In order to appease Allah, Muslims must form pure, Islamic states.
    - ii. Growth of insurgency
      - 1. The founding of the Jewish state of Israel in the Muslim world was a paramount catalyst for Islamic extremism.
      - 2. The secularization and growing cooperation with the Western world of some Arab nations seen as evidence of widespread corruption

3. Islamic attacks against the U.S. are recent manifestations, started only by the '79 U.S. embassy in Tehran hostage situation.
- iii. Two approaches
  1. Revivalist (non-violent) vs. Islamic revolutionaries (armed-struggle)
  2. No singular ruling entity; extremists merely bound by the Quran (which lends itself open to interpretation)

V. Structure

- a. See diagram:
- b. Indigenous Jihadist groups focus solely on their local enemies (ex: Hamas, Hezbollah, Tamil Tigers)
- c. Al-Qaeda focuses on establishing an Islamic state by disassembling the United States (convinced that they can achieve dismantling of states, just as they allegedly caused the Soviet Union to break apart)



- d. Global Jihadists operate under the belief that an Islamic state and victory over their local enemies can only be achieved by first defeating the United States and ending their intervention in the Muslim world (particularly the Middle East)
  - i. Bin Laden effectively merged various groups to fight *his* cause.

VI. Threat Analysis

- a. Most frequent sources: cooperation with other countries and governmental intelligence agencies, intercepted terrorist communications, interrogation of captured terrorists, documents & computer disks that have been found, open source intelligence (media, the internet, video and audio tapes, etc), analysis.
- b. Key to analysis: try to get into the mindset of the terrorists.
- c. The internet and its efficacy to spread the word
  - i. Terrorists have increasingly become dependent on the internet for distributing propaganda, training manuals (thereby lessening the necessity for training camps), assignments, plans, etc...

Kim Cragin

- I. Suicide Bombings in Context; Why study them?
  - a. Suicide bombings are an expanding threat
  - b. Attacks can be observed and measured almost daily
  - c. They provide insight into the terrorist group's decision making
- II. Analytical Challenges
  - a. The topic is a highly emotional one; objective analysis may be near-impossible
  - b. Interrogations of suicide bombers are most likely "failures," and may thus provide inaccurate or skewed information
  - c. There are differences between an individual's motivation in implementing suicide bombing attacks and a group's motivation in implementing suicide bombing attacks.
- III. History & Statistics

- a. Suicide bombings are a relatively recent terrorist act, the first (recognized) incident being a 1973 PFLP attack.
- b. There have been approximately 350 successful suicide bombings in the past 12 years
- c. Targets of suicide bombings shift from military targets ('82-91) to transportation services/public spaces ('92-'01)
- d. Suicide bombings have grown in frequency in recent years, climaxing in 2000-2001.

#### IV. Case Studies

- a. Hezbollah → “Party of God”
  - i. Militant Lebanese Shiite political party, fights Israeli occupation of parts of Southern Lebanon
  - ii. Its status as an operational base for the PLO in the 70s led to the '82 Israeli invasion
  - iii. Receives support from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards
- b. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) a.k.a. Tamil Tigers, Sri Lanka
  - i. Founded '76, seeks independent state in Sri Lanka. Their suicide bombing division are referred to as the “Black Tigers”
  - ii. The elite Black Tigers are isolated from the other members of the LTTE
  - iii. Black Tiger cadres train for specific targets and may wait years before their highly-skilled operatives are deployed
  - iv. LTTE is a secular terrorist group, and thus employ both men and women.

#### V. How insight into terrorist groups is gained by studying suicide bombings

- a. Hamas → Palestinian Islamist paramilitary group, founded by Sheikh Yasin in 1987 as an outgrowth of the 70s Muslim Brotherhood
  - i. Initially formed as a non-violent group with wishes to capitalize on the Intifada
  - ii. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin deported 415 Hamas members in '92, causing the group to shift towards a policy of violence
  - iii. As part of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli forces have assassinated over 25 key Hamas leaders, acting as a catalyst to the commencement of suicide bombings in 1994.
  - iv. Initially, suicide bombings were justified as means of retaliation/revenge (ex. Retaliation for '94 Hebron massacre, assassinations of key Hamas leaders)
  - v. The late 90's see a shift from using suicide bombings as tools of retaliation to using them as the main policy (believe that they are the only means to deter the Israeli military)
  - vi. A drop in the # of attacks can be seen between 1997-2000. Why?
    - 1. Changes in support:
      - a. '96 sees a 50% drop of Palestinian support for Hamas
        - i. Hamas leaders considered abandoning suicide bombings in 1997 due to overwhelming public disapproval.
        - ii. Since the advent of the al-Aqsa Intifada, support for Hamas has risen by 20%, and support for suicide bombings has risen by 50%... # of bombings have risen accordingly.
        - iii. Conclusion: Public opinion is VERY important to Hamas

#### Bruce Hoffman

- I. Three obstacles in fighting modern-day terrorism:
  - a. The terrorist threat is continuously changing and evolving
    - i. Our actions against terrorism forces terrorists to evolve and change; terrorist factions grow increasingly resilient.
    - ii. Our responses to terrorist have to constantly evolve, too.
  - b. Bush’s “war on terror” is not a war in the conventional sense.
    - i. The war is lengthy and complex

1. Our adversaries have defined the war as an “epic” struggle, seeing it as lasting many years. They are willing to lay low.
  2. In stark contrast, the impatient U.S. seeks to ameliorate this conflict quickly and decisively.
- c. Terrorist threats are much more diffuse and less centralized
- i. It becomes increasingly harder to target terrorists and understand their motivations and aspirations
- II. Where we are today in the fight against Al-Qaeda
- a. Many successes: ¾ of the Al-Qaeda '01 leadership and 4,000 members are either dead or apprehended, and key bases have been seized and dismantled
- III. Al-Qaeda, change, and how they are becoming increasingly difficult to fight
- a. After the initial phase of the ‘war on terror,’ Al-Qaeda proved to be extremely motivated and resilient (despite having suffered great losses).
- i. They rebounded from both the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 80s, and from the US military invasion post 9/11
- b. Al-Qaeda has reconfigured itself as an ideology rather than a bureaucratic entity
- i. Rather than following a hierarchy of leaders, sympathizers are encouraged to act out on their own, forming many smaller, unconnected Al-Qaeda groups
  - ii. The Al-Qaeda threat thus becomes something less tangible, and much easier to spread
- c. Success thus far has gone both ways
- i. The U.S. has weakened and dismantled the leaders of Al-Qaeda, but Al-Qaeda has rebounded by reforming itself
  - ii. US action in Afghanistan has mutated, inspired and motivated others to strike out against the U.S.
  - iii. Unconnected, smaller Al-Qaeda entities have shifted from careful planners (e.g. 9/11 took an estimated two years to plan) to opportunist, striking at short notice (and thus making it harder to predict attacks)
  - iv. Emphases moved from few “large” attacks to “soft” targets (smaller and less fatal targets, but occurring in higher frequency than “large” attacks)
  - v. Al-Qaeda claims to have more supporters and claim more lives post-9/11
- IV. How Al-Qaeda manages to function without Bin Laden
- a. Bin Laden, an extremely erudite man, deliberately developed a movement that would outlive him. Emphasis on “patience & steadfastness.”
- b. Bin Laden’s magnetism and ability to recruit new sympathizers increases with his absence... “His death will produce 1,000 more Osamas.”
- i. Purportedly has 18,000 members and/or active sympathizers world-wide. Extremely large in comparison to other terrorist groups (IRA, PIRA, Red Brigade... All never exceeded 400-500.)
  - ii. Despite the apprehension of ¾ of the key leaders, ranks can be quickly replenished
- V. What should the U.S. do?
- a. Learn our lessons from 9/11
- i. Don’t be molded into a false sense of complacency. Instead, maintain a strong focus & vigilance, and continuously strive to adapt to the ever changing and evolving threat of terrorism.
- b. Ensure we succeed in Iraq
- i. Form a *true* democratic and stable government (i.e. let Iraqi people decide for themselves), then LEAVE as to not portray the image that we are (once again) intervening in Middle Eastern politics. But first we must, without intervening too much, give the sense of acting as a protectorate
- c. Overhaul communications & clean up the U.S. image in the Arab World.

- i. We are considered a malignant force, even by our closest ally Jordan. Interact with the Arab media by featuring US faces on mediums such as Al-Jazeera, and vice versa (Arabs on US media sources). We must realize that we cannot *compete* with Al-Jazeera, and must therefore communicate with them.
- d. Revise Legal Issues @ Guantanamo Bay
- e. Embark on a new and conservative effort in the Palestinian-Conflict
  - i. This won't stop Al-Qaeda terrorism... but the resolution of this conflict will shape the Arab opinion of the US (hopefully for the better).
- f. Improve relations with our friends & allies.
  - i. Do NOT take them for granted; we must constantly strive to improve our alliances, because we will not always be able to unilaterally go into war like we did in Iraq.
- g. Assess where we are in the war against terrorism
  - i. We must enunciate clear views, goals, and policies against terrorism (ex: what are our views on Russia's actions against Chechen terrorist?)
  - ii. Specify who we are waging war on, since 'terrorism' is such an abstract term
  - iii. 'Terrorism' is a means of action, not an entity one can declare war upon.